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abstract: In Langues et nations en Europe Daniel Baggioni describes the historic process of  “dallage” 
or “compartimentage” of Europe that ended up with “le triomphe des langues nationales et la 
généralisation de la formule: un État / une nation / une langue”. In this paper we would like to 
adhere to the thesis that this formula is no longer tenable (HELLER, 1999; COULMAS, 2005) with 
an innovative exercise of political fiction. If Catalonia were to become an independent state (ISC), 
would she adopt the formula “one state / one nation / one language”? We will sketch a number of 
political arguments to answer to this question in the negative. Comparative politics shows that the 
majority language of a state is always (one of) the official language(s) of this state and that linguisti-
cally heterogeneous polities tend to have pluralistic language regimes. Now, Spanish is the major-
ity language in Catalonia and in any case Catalonia has the kind of linguistic heterogeneity that 
makes institutional multilingualism predictable. On the other hand, international / European cli-
mate on linguistic diversity also militate against the monist formula being implemented in the ISC 
(or in any other linguistically heterogeneous place that opts for independence) (KYMLICKA, 2007).
Keywords: Language policy. Catalan. Spanish. Catalonia. Secession. Linguistic diversity/hetero-
geneity.
resumo: Em Langues et nations en Europe (Línguas e nações na Europa) Daniel Baggioni descreve o 
processo histórico de “dallage” ou “compartimentage” da Europa, que terminou com “le triom-
phe des langues nationales et la généralisation de la formule: un État / une nation / une langue”. 
Neste trabalho nós gostaríamos de nos afiliar à tese segundo a qual esta fórmula não é mais 
sustentável (HELLER, 1999; COULMAS, 2005), mediante um exercício original de ficção política. 
Se a Catalunha se tornasse um país independente (Independent State of Catalonia - ISC), ela ado-
taria a fórmula “um Estado/ uma nação/ uma língua”? Nós vamos esboçar alguns argumentos 
políticos para responder a esta questão negativamente. A política comparativa mostra que a 
língua mais importante de um Estado sempre é a língua oficial (ou uma das línguas oficiais) deste 
Estado e que regimes linguisticamente heterogêneos tendem a ter regimes linguísticos plura-
listas. Atualmente, o espanhol é a língua mais importante na Catalunha e, de qualquer forma, a 
Catalunha tem o tipo de heterogeneidade linguística que faz o multilinguismo institucional pre-
visível. Por outro lado, o clima internacional/europeu sobre a diversidade linguística também 
influencia contra a implementação de uma fórmula monista na ISC (ou em qualquer outro lugar 
linguisticamente heterogêneo que opte pela independência) (KYMLICKA, 2007).
Palavras-chave: Política linguística. Catalão. Espanhol. Catalunha. Separação. Diversidade/he-
terogeneidade linguística.
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1 catalonia: support for secession
Catalonia is a former medieval European kingdom that entered Hispa-
nic confederation with Castille (15th century) and after losing two con-
secutive wars to her own king ended up as a mere region of Spain (18th 
century), a centralized, unitary state molded upon the French model 
–upon the formula “one state / one nation / one language”, that is. As 
in many other European “historic” regions a nationalist movement 
emerged in the 19th century. Whereas other nationalist movements 
(e.g. the Polish or the Czech ones) managed to obtain full statehood 
for their respective territories in the 20th century, the Catalan natio-
nalist movement brought about a regime of regional autonomy within 
a larger Spanish state. This happened in 1914 (with the creation of 
the so called Mancomunitat), in 1931 (in the context of the 2nd Spa-
nish Republic) and again in 1978 (in the context of the transition to 
democracy after Franco’s death). Now, more than 30 years after the 
creation of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, her actual level 
of autonomy is increasingly contested. Recent polls show that around 
25% of the population chooses independence when asked what the 
relationship of Catalonia to Spain should be:
Table 1 – Regarding the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, you think 
that catalonia should be…
%
A region of Spain 5.6
An autonomous community of Spain 33.2
A state within a federal Spain 31.9
An independent state 24.5
Doesn't know 3.5
Doesn't answer 1.3
TOTAL 100
Source: Baròmetre d’opinió pública. 1st wave. February 2011.
24.5 is a significant but modest percentage. However, polls also 
show that when the choice is reduced to two alternatives (full indepen-
dence or continued union with Spain) the support for independence gets 
higher. In the last couple of years, this support reached its highest scores 
ever. Shortly after the Spanish Constitutional Court invalidated crucial 
provisions of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy (July 2010), the sup-
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porters of independence even (albeit momentarily) outnumbered their 
adversaries, as shown in table 2.
table 2 – If there were a referendum on the independence of catalonia 
tomorrow, what would you vote?
Oct. 2009 March 2010 May 2010 July 2010 Sept.2010
For 35 36 37 47 40
Against 46 44 41 36 45
Difference -11 -8 -4 +11 -5
 Source: Instituto Noxa for La Vanguardia daily. Results (rounded) are in percentage1.
At the time of writing this paper the latest poll known to the au-
thor (daily Ara, December 2010) showed a 38 percent of independence 
supporters and 43 of adversaries, a result quite similar to the last one 
shown in table 2. No matter how insufficient these figures might still 
appear for Catalonia to achieve independence, the truth is that a federa-
tion of two long-standing nationalist parties that flirt with Catalonia’s 
“right to decide” won the last (2010) regional election by a wide mar-
gin. As a matter of fact, Artur Mas, leader of “Convergència i Unió” and 
new regional president, took this right for granted in his first speech 
before the Catalan Parliament on December 20, 2010: “If Catalonia is a 
nation, we Catalan people have the democratic right to decide what is 
more convenient for us as a people”. And for the term 2011-2014 he an-
nounced a full “national transition” based on the right to decide.
2 catalonia: secessionist discourse on language
What do Catalan secessionist leaders have to say on the language issue? In 
the 2010 regional election three self-confessed secessionist parties rallied: 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the historic secessionist party; 
Reagrupament, a split of the former; and Solidaritat Catalana per la 
Independència, a populist front headed by former FC Barcelona president 
Joan Laporta, where a number of former ERC members also landed. 
In the electoral campaign Reagrupament introduced The Consti-
tution of Catalonia, “the first draft bill Reagrupament elected members 
at the Parliament of Catalonia will submit for approval” (It has to be 
said that Reagrupament did not get a single seat.). In this constitution 
1  Author’s translation.
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Catalan is said to be the sole official language. No mention whatsoever 
is made of Spanish, whereas Occitan – the Romance language spoken 
by some 2,000 people in the Aran Valley – is announced to be the sole 
official language in that territory. (Notice how different this is from 
the present situation: Occitan is now official in Catalonia, not just in 
the Aran, and in the Aran it shares this status with both Catalan and 
Spanish).
Article 5. La llengua. El català és la llengua pròpia, nacional i oficial de 
Catalunya. │La llibertat lingüística està garantida. │ L’occità, denomi-
nat aranès a l’Aran, és també llengua oficial en aquell territori2.
In terms of the instrumental – constitutive divide in the filed 
of language ideologies that De Schutter (2007b) and De Schutter and 
Boyden (2008) have singled out, Reagrupament overwhelmingly sides 
with the radical wing of the constitutive party. Witness:
Les llengües són molt més que un mitjà per transmetre informació, 
són un mitjà d’identificació, de cohesió i de referència del grup. A les 
llengües se les ha definit com l’ADN dels pobles. Qualsevol llengua és 
herència i testament, l’hem rebuda dels nostres pares i l’hem de trans-
metre als nostres fills. No hi ha identitat sense llengua. │ La llengua 
de cada poble és la materialització del seu fet cultural, és l’expressió 
de l’evolució sociocultural d’una comunitat humana. Si els valors de 
cada poble són diferents, també ho és la concreció d’aquests valors 
mitjançant la parla3.
As for Solidaritat, its electoral program clearly hinted at a “Cata-
lan only” future:
2  Article 5. Language. Catalonia has its own, national and official language, the Catalan language. 
│ Aran has its own, national and official language in that territory, the Occitan language in its Ara-
nese variety.│ Linguistic freedom is ensured [English translation consulted on the site of the referred 
party].
3  Languages are much more than a means to convey information, they are a means of identification, 
cohesion and reference group. A language is defined as the DNA of peoples. Any language is legacy 
and will, we have received it from our parents and we have to pass it on to our children. There is no 
identity without language. │ The language of each people is the realization of their cultural fact, it is 
the expression of the socio-cultural evolution of a human community. If the values of each people are 
different, so is the realization of these values through speech [Author’s translation].
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Els drets territorials de la llengua pròpia de Catalunya han de ser el ma-
teixos que té l’espanyol a Espanya o el portuguès, el francès, o l’anglès 
als seus respectius països4.
Now, the electoral program of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC) did not contain any explicit project of monolingualism, but this is 
the horizon of this party’s discourse on language. As a matter of fact, in 
the 2006-2010 term, when ERC was responsible for language policy 
within the Catalan autonomous government, the notion of Catalan as 
the sole “public common language” (or simply “common language”) of 
Catalonia was introduced. In the official report Balanç de política lin-
guistica 2004-2010, we can read the following statement:
La Secretaria de Política Lingüística del Govern de Catalunya treballa 
fonamentalment per aconseguir que el català (i l’occità) sigui una llen-
gua de ple ús dins el seu propi territori, i esdevingui la llengua pública 
comuna de Catalunya, com a factor fonamental per garantir la cohesión 
social del país5.
What does “common public language” mean? Among other things, 
it means the sole official language. Not surprisingly, the terms of compa-
rison drawn by Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira, vice-president of the Catalan 
government (2006-2010) and highest responsible for its language policy 
at the time, strikingly resemble those set forth by Solidaritat in its elec-
toral manifesto. In a solemn lecture given on February 7, 2007 Carod-
-Rovira argued that Catalan should be the language of the Catalans “as 
it is Italian in Rome, French in Paris or Spanish in Madrid”, which re-
duces any other language to the status of “private language of personal 
use” (2007, p. 11). 
The adoption of the Catalan-as-common-language theory is an 
interesting turning point in the history of language ideologies in Cata-
lonia. In terms of the language ideologies divide suggested by Woolard 
(2008a; 2008b), Catalonia has experienced a marked shift from authen-
4  The territorial rights of Catalonia’s own language should be the same as those of Spanish in Spain, 
or the Portuguese, French, or English in their respective countries [Author’s translation].
5  The Secretariat of Linguistic Policy of the Government of Catalonia works mainly to get Catalan (and 
Occitan) to be a language of full use within its own territory, and to become the common public language 
of Catalonia, as a key factor to ensure the social cohesion of the country [Author’s translation].
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ticity to anonymity. In the early 1980s Catalan language planners be-
gan stressing the status of Catalan as Catalonia’s “llengua pròpia” (own 
language) and ended up in the late 1990s and early 2000s advocating its role 
as Catalonia’s “llengua comuna” (common language). A certain drive for 
“commonality” was already perceptible in the first pro-Catalan campaign 
in the early 1980s, that ran under the motto “el català, cosa de tots” 
(Catalan, everyone’s business). But it is not until the last years of the 
20th century that the idea that Catalan should be everybody’s language 
of communication (not just Catalan-speakers’) came to the fore. Now, 
what is more interesting in this shift is that the nationalist logic that 
underlies Catalan language policy has been kept intact. The one nation/
one (own, national) language formula has just been turned into the stri-
kingly similar one nation/one common language.
3 catalonia: linguistic situation
This “Catalan only” discourse has paradoxically arisen in a context 
where Catalan has lost its old-time demographic hegemony. Over 
the years Catalonia has become a multilingual region, where around 
300 languages are present, but its distinctive characteristic is bilin-
gualism not multilingualism. Catalonia is basically a bilingual region 
where Spanish not Catalan is the predominant language.
Regarding the linguistic affiliation of people, Catalan surveys 
make a three-way distinction between “first (or initial) language” 
(the language that a person learned first, which is equivalent to the 
more traditional “mother tongue”), “own language” (the language 
that a person considers her language) and “usual language” (the 
language that a person speaks more often). Let us see some data on 
these three notions in turn. The source for the data is always the 
Enquesta d’Usos Lingüísticos de la Població de 2008 (from now on 
EULP).
Spanish is the largest initial language of Catalonia, 23 points 
ahead of Catalan. Catalonia’s third initial language is Arabic. After Ara-
bic, the only initial language with more than 50,000 speakers appears 
to be Romanian. (Between 20,000 and 50,000 we have five additional 
languages, not shown in the table.)
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table 3 – Initial language, catalonia, 2008.
Thousands %
Spanish 3.389,0 55,0
Catalan 1.949,5 31,6
Both 236,5 3,8
Arabic 162,3 2,6
Other 375,0 6,1
6.162,5 100,0
 Source: EULP 2008. Population of 15 yrs. and above.
Spanish is also the largest “own language”, 9 points ahead of 
Catalan. (The distance is now shorter because a number of people who 
learned Spanish first now consider Catalan or both Catalan and Spanish 
to be their languages.) Arabic ranks third again.
table 4 – own language, catalonia, 2008.
Thousands %
Spanish 2.867,5 46,5
Catalan 2.295,3 37,2
Both 542,8 8,8
Arabic 149,2 2,4
Other 244,2 3,9
6.162,5 100,0
Source: EULP 2008. Population of 15 yrs. and above.
As for the “usual language”, Spanish is again the largest one, some 
10 points ahead of Catalan. As in the two previous cases, Arabic ranks third.
table 5 – usual language, catalonia, 2008.
thsds. %
Spanish 2.830,0 45,9
Catalan 2.196,6 35,6
Both 735,4 11,9
Arabic 115,9 1,9
Other 223,1 3,5
6.162,5 100,0
Source: EULP 2008. Population of 15 yrs. and above.
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4 a view of comparative politics (I)
No matter what secessionist leaders proclaim, what does comparative 
politics have to say on the language regime of the ISC? The first obvious 
thing is that should the ISC chose institutional monolingualism, it 
would be a clamorous exception to a well established rule. In Europe 
there are some states with large minority languages that are not official 
languages even regionally (witness Romania vis-à-vis Hungarian or 
Latvia and Letonia vis-à-vis Russian) but there is no single state where 
the largest language spoken by the citizens of this state is not an offi-
cial language.
If we take a look at the official languages of the 27 EU member 
States an easy generalization arises. In all cases, the majority language of 
the citizens is (one of) the official language(s) of the state, as we show on 
the following table:
State Majority language(s) Official language(s)
1 Austria German German
2 Belgium French and Dutch French and Dutch
3 Bulgaria Bulgarian Bulgarian
4 Cyprus Greek Greek and Turkish
5 Czech Republic Czech Czech
6 Denmark Danish Danish
7 Estonia Estonian Estonian
8 Finland Finnish Finnish and Swedish
9 France French French
10 Germany German German
11 Greece Greek Greek
12 Hungary Hungarian Hungarian
13 Ireland English English and Irish
14 Italy Italian Italian
15 Latvia Latvian Latvian
16 Lithuania Lithuanian Lithuanian
17 Luxembourg Luxembourgish French, German, and Luxembourgish
18 Malta Maltese English and Maltese
19 Netherlands Dutch Dutch
20 Poland Polish Polish
21 Portugal Portuguese Portuguese
22 Romania Romanian Romanian
23 Slovakia Slovakian Slovakian
24 Slovenia Slovenian Slovenian
25 Spain Spanish Spanish
26 Sweden Swedish Swedish
27 United Kingdom English English 
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The same rule applies to the rest of Europe. The reference to 
“citizens” is relevant to discard the case of Andorra, the microstate (468 
km2) located on the border between France and Spain. In Andorra, the 
largest language among the population is Spanish not Catalan, whereas 
Catalan is the sole state language. According to the last survey6, 44 per 
cent of the people declared to have Spanish as their mother tongue. Cata-
lan ranked second with a scant 29 per cent. The exotic thing about Andor-
ra is that most residents do not count as citizens. In 2008 of 72.273 resi-
dents aged 15 or more just 21.773 (30 per cent) had Andorran citizenship. 
But if we stick to citizens, no exception arises. Among this group of the 
population, Catalan speakers (59 per cent) clearly outweigh Spanish spe-
akers (41 per cent). In any case, Andorra is clearly not a “standard” state.
These factual considerations have a normative dimension as well. 
The fact that Catalonia is not a monolingual region provides the context 
in which De Schutter (2007a) briefly touched upon the issue of Catalonia’s 
secession. In this paper De Shchutter criticized liberal nationalism for his 
endorsement of territorial monolingualism. His point was that liberal 
nationalism relies on the empirically false assumption that the world is 
“a mosaic of territorially distinct ‘national monisms’”. According to him, 
“while the nationalistic case might have some value for states like Iceland 
or Hungary, which have remained virtually mononational, it cannot pro-
vide a solution for the majority of the world’s states and regions” (p. 385). 
One of the regions where the instantiation of the nationalistic solution 
would give rise to an injustice is precisely Catalonia: “Thus, if Catalonia 
secedes or becomes politically self-determining, then this (read: national 
monism) unfairly discriminates against those Catalans who derive their 
identity and their freedom-enabling context of choice not or not only 
from the Catalan but (also) from the Spanish nation” (Ibid.). 
In other words, what De Schutter (2007a, p. 392) was saying is 
that the principle of nationalities, “which states that it is valuable for 
the boundaries of political units to coincide with national (read: linguis-
tic) boundaries” cannot be applied to Catalonia. The criticism on the 
principle of nationalities is as old as the principle itself. Interestingly 
enough, one of the first scholars that commented on the inapplicabili-
ty of the principle (well before it was implemented in 1918) was Cata-
lan historian and nationalist thinker Antoni Rovira. In his Historia de 
6  Cf. with “Coneixements i usos linguistics de la población d’Andorra 2009” (1995-2009).
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los movimientos nacionalistas (1920) he dwelt, among others, on the case 
of Macedonia. Rovira noticed that the partition of Macedonia between 
Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria after the First Balkan War might hinder 
what he termed the “principio nacionalista”; but not really: 
La caótica, la tremenda mezcla de razas, lenguas y religiones 
en aquella parte de la península balcánica, hace de todo punto 
insuficiente el principio de las nacionalidades naturales para 
delimitar las diversas zonas nacionales macedónicas. Desde 
este punto de vista, Macedonia es el país más complicado del 
mundo. (1920, p. 400). 
Now, Catalonia is not as complicated as Macedonia was (and 
still is in many respects), but as shown above Catalonia is not a lin-
guistically homogeneous region either. (Speaking of the Balkan region 
in general, Rovira emphasized that “somos los primeros en reconocer 
que el principio de las nacionalidades es insuficiente para resolver los 
problemas étnicos y lingüísticos de aquella península, donde la super-
posición de razas [sic] y naciones es un hecho que todo lo complica)” 
(1920, p. 402).
5 a view of comparative politics (II)
Comparative politics not only shows that the largest spoken language of 
every EU member is also (one of) the official language(s) this EU member. 
Comparative politics also shows the troubles that linguistically hetero-
geneous newly independent states have run into when they have tried 
to adopt institutional monolingualism. If we adopt Lijphart’s threshold 
(1984) (a state is homogeneous if at least 80 percent of its citizens are 
native speakers of the same language), of the 18 states that have emer-
ged in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall (from Slovenia to Kosovo), 
seven are clearly linguistically heterogeneous. (As for Bosnia and Herze-
govina, we take Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian to be different languages. 
In this case no official data have been collected after the last Yugoslav 
census.) We may visualize this with the following table, elaborated 
by us on basis of the respective census7:
7  Cf. also with Lijphart (1984). 
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Table 6 – Ethnolinguistic make up of linguistically heterogeneous states
Year of latest 
census and 
population
Question in the 
census
% of largest 
language
% of other 
languages
Belarus (1999)
 045.000
На каком языке 
Вы обычно 
разговариваете 
дома? 
Language usually 
spoken at home
Russian 62,8 Belarusian 36,7
BiH (1991)
4.377.033
Nacionalna
 osnova
Ethnic 
composition
Muslim 43,5 Serbian 31,2
Croatian 17,4
Estonia (2000)
1.370.052
Emakeel
Mother language
Estonian 67,3 Russian 29,7
Latvia (2000)
2.377.383
Dzimtā valoda
Mother language
Latvian 59,0 Russian 37,4
Macedo-
nia
(2002)
2.022.547
мајчин јазик
Mother language
Macedonian 6,5 Albanian 5,1
Turkish 3,5
Roma 1,9
Serbian 1,2
Moldova 
(without 
Transd-
niester)
(2004)
3.383.332
Limba maternă
Mother language
Limba, în care
 vorbeşte de 
obicei
Language 
usually spoken
Moldavian 60,0 
Moldavian 58,8
Romanian 16,5
Russian 11,3
Ukrainian 5,5
Gagauz 4,1
Bulgarian 1,6
Romanian 16,4
Russian 16,0
Ukrainian 3,8
Gagauz 3,1
Bulgarian 1,1
Ukraine (2001)
8.457.000
Рідна мова
Native language
Ukrainian 
67,5
Russian 
29,6
Of these seven linguistically heterogeneous states three have 
formally embraced some form of institutional multilingualism. BiH and 
one of the two Bosnian “entities” (the Federation of BiH) did it from 
the scratch (1995). So did the other “entity” later on, Republika Srpska.
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Compare the wordings of the former and present-day constitu-
tions of the Repubika Srpska:
Former (1992) Present-day (Amendment LXXI)
In the Republika Srpska the official 
language is Serbian in the ijekavian and 
ekavian pronunciation and the Cyrillic 
alphabet, and Latin alphabet in the 
manner provided by law.
The official languages of the Republika 
Srpska are: the language of the Serb peo-
ple, the language of the Bosniak people 
and the language of the Croat people. The 
official scripts are Cyrillic and Latin
 In 1996, Belarus abandoned (Belarusian) monolingualism and 
embraced Russian as the second state language. Compare the wording 
of the 1994 and 1996 constitutions:
Former (1994) Present-day (1996)
The official language of the Republic of 
Belarus shall be Belarusian
The Belarusian and Russian languages 
shall be the official languages of the 
Republic of Belarus
Macedonia started with monolingualism but after the Lake Ohrid 
Agreements (2001) she had to embrace a sui generis form on institu-
tional bilingualism. Compare the wording of the original and the post-
-Ohrid constitutions:
Former Present-day
The Macedonian language, 
written using its Cyrillic al-
phabet, is the official language 
in the Republic of Macedonia
The Macedonian language, written using its Cy-
rillic alphabet, is the official language through-
out the Republic of Macedonia and in the inter-
national relations of the Republic of Macedonia. 
Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent 
of the population is also an official language, 
written using its alphabet, as specified below
As for the other four linguistically heterogeneous states, in all 
cases we find certain developments towards forms of institutional bi- or 
multilingualism.
In Moldova we do have institutional multilingualism in the 
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Găgăuzia. But bilingualism is also on 
the (statewide) political agenda. In Moldova there is a breakaway 
territory (Transdniester) that has declared three official languages 
(Russian, Moldavian, and Ukrainian). Now, it is likely to imagine that 
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if Transdniester comes back under Moldavian sovereignty Russian will 
become either the second official language of Moldavia or the predominant 
regional official language of Transdniester. As a matter of fact, in 2005 the 
Parliament of Moldova passed a special law for Transdniester (Legea cu 
privire la prevederile de bază ale statutului juridic special al localităţilor din 
stînga Nistrului 8) that foresees official (regional) status for both Russian 
and Ukrainian (along with Moldavian) but also the possibility to com-
municate with the Republic’s authorities located outside Transdniester. See 
article 6 of this law:
(2) Limbile oficiale în Transnistria sînt limba moldovenească, în 
baza grafiei latine, limbile ucraineană şi rusă. Republica Moldova 
garantează funcţionarea şi altor limbi pe teritoriul Transnistriei. 
(3) În Transnistria, lucrările de secretariat şi corespondenţa cu 
autorităţile publice ale Republicii Moldova, cu întreprinderile, cu 
organizaţiile şi cu instituţiile situate în afara Transnistriei se ţin 
în limba moldovenească, în baza grafiei latine, şi în limba rusă9.
In Ukraine, there is a permanent debate on the status of Russian 
as second official language. Constitutional provisions notwithstanding, 
Russian is de facto a second official language, especially in the Crimean 
Autonomous Republic. This leaves Estonia and Latvia as two exceptions 
to the rule that links linguistic heterogeneity to institutional bi- or mul-
tilingualism. But even in these two states there is more linguistic pluralism 
than meets the eye. As for Estonia, under the guise of strict institu-
tional monolingualism one finds what Rannut (2004a; 2004b) termed 
a “bilingual (territorial) language regime”. The Estonian Constitution 
does not foresee a second state language, not even a regional official 
language, but still it acknowledges the possibility to use a language 
other than Estonian as an internal working language of relevant local 
governments (as a local official language, that is). The same section of 
the Estonian Constitution that specifies Estonian as the language of 
state agencies and local governments makes room for this:
8  Law on Basic Provisions of the legal status of settlements from Transnistria.
9  (2) The official languages in Transdniester are Moldovan, in the Latin script, Ukrainian and Rus-
sian languages. The Republic of Moldova guarantees the functioning of other languages in Transnis-
tria. (3) In Transdniester, secretarial work and correspondence with the Moldova’s government, en-
terprises, organizations and institutions located outside Transdniester takes place in Moldovan, in the 
Latin script, and in Russian [Author’s translation].
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§ 52. (2) Võõrkeelte, sealhulgas vähemusrahvuste keelte kasuta-
mise riigiasutuses ning kohtu- ja kohtueelses menetluses sätes-
tab seadus10.
According to Rannut (2004b, p. 47), the 52 (2) paragraph of the 
Estonian Constitution “enables the existence of the official bilingual lan-
guage regime in an officially monolingual state”. Now, the fact is that this 
alleged bilingual language regime has not prevented a number of bodies 
and international institutions from criticizing Estonia’s stand towards its 
largest regional or minority language, namely Russian (RANNUT, 1995; 
DRUVIETE, 1997; OZOLINS, 2003). As a result, Estonia has been obliged to 
change her language legislation a number of times, but even after these 
changes criticism continues. A specific point in the ongoing discussion 
is Estonia’s reluctance to ratify the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages. The ratification of the Charter for Regional 
and Minority Languages (with Russian as an explicit target language) is 
a move that such diverse organizations as Amnesty International (2006) 
and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance – ECRI – 
(2002, 2006) have demanded in recent times. As for Latvia, we will not 
go into it now but we cannot help noticing that ECRI has repeatedly 
recommended (1999, 2002, 2008) that Latvia ratify the Charter.
6 the new climate on linguistic diversity
The recognition of languages and linguistic diversity is a worldwide 
trend. In this section we will not go into the philosophical turnabouts 
that underlie this trend (KYMLICKA, 2007) but will content ourselves to 
take notice of a symptom and a consequence of this trend, namely the 
fact that the absolute number of official languages (statewide or regional) 
has increased all over the world.
This trend can be clearly observed in South America. In the 1990s a 
number of states in this area adopted institutional bi- or multilingualism in 
their constitutions. In this respect, Paraguay is something of a pioneering 
state. In its 1967 Constitution a sole official language was recognized, 
but the duality of national languages was already proclaimed:
10  § 52. (2) In localities where the language of the majority of the residents is not Estonian, local 
governments may, to the extent and pursuant to procedure provided by law, use the language of the 
majority of the permanent residents of the locality as an internal working language [English transla-
tion consulted on the site of the Estonian Government].
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Artículo 5. Los idiomas nacionales de la Republica son el español y el 
guaraní. Será de uso oficial el español.
In the constitutional reform of 1992, Guarani obtained full status 
as one of Paraguay’s two official languages:
Artículo 140. El Paraguay es un país pluricultural y bilingüe. │ Son idio-
mas oficiales el castellano y el guaraní. La ley establecerá las modalida-
des de utilización de uno y otro. │ Las lenguas indígenas, así como las 
de otras minorías, forman parte del patrimonio cultural de la Nación. 
At that very time other South American states started to move 
towards forms of (statewide or regional) multilingualism. In 1991 Co-
lombia abandoned her 1886 constitution, which was silent on language 
issues (implicitly recognized Spanish as the sole official language) and 
embraced a vague form of regional multilingualism.
Artículo 10. El castellano es el idioma oficial de Colombia. Las lenguas y 
dialectos de los grupos étnicos son también oficiales en sus territorios. 
La enseñanza que se imparta en las comunidades con tradiciones 
lingüísticas propias será bilingüe. 
In the case of Peru, the 1993 Constitution was a little more explicit 
and mentioned Aymara and Quechua as regional official languages, 
along with an unspecific number of other aboriginal languages:
Artículo 48. Son idiomas oficiales el castellano y, en las zonas donde 
predominen, también lo son el quechua, el aimara y las demás lenguas 
aborígenes, según la ley.
As for Venezuela, the 1999 Constitution resembles that of neigh-
boring Colombia:
Artículo 9. El idioma oficial es el castellano. Los idiomas indígenas tam-
bién son de uso oficial para los pueblos indígenas y deben ser respetados 
en todo el territorio de la República, por constituir patrimonio cultural 
de la Nación y de la humanidad.
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In the case of Ecuador, the 2008 constitution introduced a sui 
generis distinction between “official language” and “official language 
for intercultural relationship”; the rest of the relevant article is in line 
with the constitutions of Colombia and Venezuela (the “ancestral” lan-
guages are supposed to be official in their zones):
Artículo 2. […] El castellano es el idioma oficial del Ecuador; el castella-
no, el kichwa y el shuar son idiomas oficiales de relación intercultural. 
Los demás idiomas ancestrales son de uso oficial para los pueblos in-
dígenas en las zonas donde habitan y en los términos que fija la ley. El 
Estado respetará y estimulará su conservación y uso.
In the pursuit of multilingualism, the South American state 
that has gone further is Bolivia, no doubt. Spanish is the state lan-
guage along with 36 indigenous languages, which makes Bolivia the 
state with more official languages in the entire world (South Africa 
ranks second, with its 11 state languages). This ample recognition is 
nuanced by a mandate of mere bilingualism on central and regional 
governments:
Artículo 5. I. Son idiomas oficiales del Estado el castellano y todos los 
idiomas de las naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos (sic), 
que son el aymara, araona, baure, bésiro, canichana, cavineño, cayuba-
ba, chácobo, chimán, ese ejja, guaraní, guarasu’we, guarayu, itonama, 
leco, machajuyai-kallawaya, machineri, maropa, mojeñotrinitario, mo-
jeño-ignaciano, moré, mosetén, movima, pacawara, puquina, quechua, 
sirionó, tacana, tapiete, toromona, uru-chipaya, weenhayek, yaminawa, 
yuki, yuracaré y zamuco. │ II. El Gobierno plurinacional y los gobiernos 
departamentales deben utilizar al menos dos idiomas oficiales. Uno de 
ellos debe ser el castellano, y el otro se decidirá tomando en cuenta el 
uso, la conveniencia, las circunstancias, las necesidades y preferencias 
de la población en su totalidad o del territorio en cuestión. Los demás 
gobiernos autónomos deben utilizar los idiomas propios de su territo-
rio, y uno de ellos debe ser el castellano.
As far as South America is concerned, all these developments 
have turned the issue of language recognition upside down. Strict 
institutional monolingualism is becoming more and more the exception 
Letras, Santa Maria, v. 21, n. 42, p. 73-96,  jan./jun. 2011
89
Language 
Policy in the 
Independent 
State of 
Catalonia
rather than the rule. Even countries that (still) stick to institutional mo-
nolingualism do recognize other languages, for instance in educational 
matters. Brazil is a case in point. Witness articles 13, on the one hand, 
and 210 and 231, on the other hand, of the Brazilian constitution:
Artigo. 13. A língua portuguesa é o idioma oficial da República Federa-
tiva do Brasil.
Art. 210. § 2º. O ensino fundamental regular será ministrado em língua 
portuguesa, assegurada às comunidades indígenas também a utilização 
de suas línguas maternas e processos próprios de aprendizagem.
Art. 231. São reconhecidos aos índios sua organização social, costumes, 
línguas, crenças e tradições, e os direitos originários sobre as terras que 
tradicionalmente ocupam, competindo à União demarcá-las, proteger e 
fazer respeitar todos os seus bens.
If we are to credit the New York Times of august, 28th 2005, on 
a more anecdotal level we can record the fact in 2003 Nheengatu was 
voted to be an official language along with Portuguese in São Gabriel da 
Cachoeira: 
By vote of the local council, São Gabriel da Cachoeira became the only 
municipality in Brazil to recognize a language other than Portuguese as 
official, conferring that status on língua geral [Nheengatu] and two local 
Indian tongues.
If we go back now to Europe, it is no less clear that in the last years 
the number of (statewide or regional) official languages has increased. 
As for the state level, in section 5 we have already dwelt upon a number 
of states in Eastern and Central Europe that have embraced institutional 
bilingualism. In Western Europe it is true that no state has increased the 
number of its (statewide) official languages in recent times, with the ex-
ception of Switzerland, where Romansh acquired a certain status as the 
fourth official language of the Confederation. But it is also true that the 
linguistic heterogeneity in Western Europe is much lower than in the East. 
In any case, if we turn into the regional level the recognition of linguistic 
diversity has attained a level unheard of, both in the East and in the West.
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Take Spain, to begin with. Prior to its 1978 democratic constitu-
tion, Spain had one (statewide) official language. Now it has the same 
old (statewide) official language but also three regional official languages 
(Catalan/Valencian, Basque and Galician) – four if we add Occitan, which 
is official “in Catalonia” in the terms of the new Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy:
§6. (5) La llengua occitana, denominada aranès a l’Aran, és la llengua 
pròpia d’aquest territori i és oficial a Catalunya, d’acord amb el que es-
tableixen aquest Estatut i les lleis de normalització lingüística11.
In the recent years these three regional official languages have 
made some inroads in Spanish central institutions. Now it is possible 
to use them in the Spanish Senate (located in Madrid) and the Boletín 
Official del Estado, a traditional stronghold of Spanish monolingualism, 
is also published in Catalan/Valencian and Galician.
The substate entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have also 
increased their number official languages. The so called Republika 
Srpska started with one (Serbian) and ended up with three (Serbian, 
Bosnian, and Croatian). A similar thing happened in the other half of 
BiH, the so called Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: from two 
official languages (Bosnian and Croatian) to three (Bosnian, Croatian, 
and Serbian).
If we go further into the substate level, we can observe some 
other relevant cases. In section 5 we mentioned Moldova’s Autonomous 
Territorial Unit of Găgăuzia, where Gagauz and Russian are regional 
official languages. Now, a number of newly independent states recognize 
regional or local official languages in their constitutions. Witness 
article 11 of the Slovenian constitution:
Article 11. The official language of Slovenia is Slovenian. In the areas 
where the ethnic Italian and Hungarian reside, Italian and Hungarian 
shall also be official languages.
11  §6. (5) The Occitan language, known as Aranese in Aran, is Aran’s own language and is official in 
Catalonia, as established by this Estatut and by the laws of linguistic normalization [English transla-
tion consulted on the respective site].
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Although no explicit mention is made of specific languages, article 
12 of the Croatian constitution has the same spirit:
Article 12. The Croatian language and the Latin script shall be in official 
use in the Republic of Croatia. In individual local units another language 
and the Cyrillic or some other script may, along with the Croatian lan-
guage and the Latin script, be introduced into official use under condi-
tions specified by law.
Other Eastern European constitution do not explicitly talk of 
“official language” or “official use” but also introduce some kind of 
guarantee for the languages of ethnic minorities; this is the case at least 
of Estonia (as we saw in section 5), Hungary, and Slovakia.
Now, if we go beyond explicit official status or “official use” pro-
visions and look into other means of language protection, it is relevant 
to observe the large number of languages that have obtained some degree 
of recognition under the European Charter for Regional of Minority 
languages. As of January 1, 2011 25 European states had ratified the 
Charter and engaged themselves in the protection of dozens of languages, 
as we may visualize on the following table, elaborated by us on basis of 
the data from Council of Europe: 
Armenia Assyrian, Yezidi, Greek, Russian, and Kurdish
Austria Burgenlandcroatian, Slovenian, Hungarian, Czech, and Slova-
kian + Romani
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Albanian, Montenegrin, Czech, Italian, Hungarian, Macedonian, 
German, Polish, Romanian, Romani, Rusyn, Slovak, Slovene, 
Turkish, Ukrainian, and Jewish (Yiddish and Ladino)
Croatia Italian, Serbian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian, and 
Ukrainian
Cyprus Cypriot Maronite Arabic and Armenian
Czech Republic Slovak, Polish, German, and Romani
Denmark the German minority language in Southern Jutland
Finland Karelian, Romani, and Sami + Swedish language which is the less 
widely used official language in Finland
Germany Danish, Upper Sorbian, Lower Sorbian, North Frisian and 
Sater Frisian languages, and the Romani language of the Ger-
man Sinti and Roma + Low German
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Hungary Béas, Croatian, German, Romani, Romanian, Serbian, Slovak, 
and Slovene
Liechtenstein Liechtenstein declared that “there are no regional or minority lan-
guages in the sense of the Charter in the territory of the Principality 
of Liechtenstein at the time of ratification”
Luxembourg
Montenegro Albanian and Romani
Netherlands Frisian language in the province of Friesland, Lower-Saxon lan-
guages and, in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 5, Yiddish 
and Romani + Limburger
Norway Sami
Poland Belarusian, Czech, Hebrew, Yiddish, Karaim, Kashub, Lithu-
anian, Lemko, German, Armenian, Romani, Russian, Slovak, Ta-
tar, and Ukrainian
Romania Albanian, Armenian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, German, Greek, 
Italian, Yiddish, Macedonian, Hungarian, Polish, Romany, Rus-
sian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Tatar, Turkish, and Ukrainian
Serbia Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romany, Romanian, 
Ruthenian, Slovakian, Ukrainian, and Croatian
Slovakia Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Roma, 
Ruthenian, and Ukrainian
Slovenia Hungarian, Italian, and Romani
Spain the languages recognized as official languages in the Statutes of 
Autonomy of the Autonomous Communities of the Basque Coun-
try, Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Galicia, Valencia and Navarra + 
the languages protected by the Statutes of Autonomy in the ter-
ritories where they are traditionally spoken are also considered 
as regional or minority languages
Sweden Sami, Finnish and Meänkieli (Tornedal Finnish) + Romani Chib 
and Yiddish
Switzerland Romansh and Italian as the less widely used official languages
Ukraine Belarusian, Bulgarian, Gagauz, Greek, Jewish, Crimean Tatar, 
Moldavian, German, Polish, Russian, Romanian, Slovak, and 
Hungarian
United Kingdom Welsh, Scottish-Gaelic, and Irish Scots and Ulster Scots + Cornish 
Manx Gaelic
Could the ISC afford not ratifying the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages? It is highly unlikely. Now, if Spanish 
were not an official language of the ISC but the ISC would ratify the 
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Charter, the formula one nation/one state/one language would be no 
less feasible. As a regional or minority language, Spanish would be simply 
so large, and the benefits its speakers would obtain from the Charter 
so ample, that regardless of constitutional provisions the ISC could not 
help embracing de facto institutional bilingualism.
7 conclusion
In January 2011 a report appeared in the Time magazine that sampled 
the Top 10 of “Aspiring Nations” – places vying for independence, that 
is. Catalan secessionist leaders were disappointed because Catalonia 
was not in a list headed by Scotland, the Basque Country, and Tibet. 
They were even puzzled to see the Republic of Cascadia (don’t ask where 
it is), Padania, and the Second Vermont Republic being included in it. 
Yet Catalonia is a place where secessionism has taken hold, where it can 
grow further and where it could bear fruit in a not too distant future. 
No matter how (un)realistic this prospect might be it is interesting to 
ask: if Catalonia were to secede from Spain, would she adopt institutional 
monolingualism? 
In this paper we answered this question in the negative with a 
number of political considerations. First, Spanish is the majority language 
in Catalonia and short of an unlikely massive exodus of Spanish-speakers 
(and of course short of ethnic cleansing), it will be the majority language 
in the ISC. Comparative politics tells us that the majority language of 
a state is (one of) the official language(s) of that state. Second, even 
if Spanish were not the majority language, it would still be too large a 
language for the ISC not to recognize it and award it some form of (at 
least de facto) official status. Third, it is a fact that newly independent 
states that are linguistically heterogeneous face difficulties when they 
try to adopt institutional monolingualism. (Even a fairly homogeneous 
newly independent state like Kosovo has been constrained to recognize 
Serbian as a statewide official language.) Fourth, these difficulties are 
connected to the new international and European climate on linguis-
tic diversity that militates against traditional forms of institutional 
monolingualism. 
To say a final word on this matter, notice that this is not a paper 
about Catalonia; this is a paper on the interplay of linguistic heterogeneity 
and language regimes. In the old times (read: 19th and 20th centuries) it 
was possible to obtain independence, get rid of your internal linguistic 
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diversity and fully adhere to the monist formula. Now the time for this 
kind of policy is over. Our claim is that strict institutional monolingualism 
is not an option anymore for any linguistically heterogeneous polity 
that obtains full independence. So the real question is not whether any 
of these polities would adopt monolingualism anymore but rather what 
form of institutional multilingualism they will adopt once they are 
independent.
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